# R3 D7 Disclosure

# 1NC

### T---1NC

Topicality---

**Interpretation---the aff should only win the debate if they can prove the resolution is true**

**The USfg is made up of three branches in Washington D.C.**

**Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98** (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292)

United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of states (originally thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections according to subject and revised from time to time COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature (the Congress) with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President) and a judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and executive (the Governor) as well as its own legal system and constitution

**“Core antitrust laws” refers to the Sherman and Clayton Act**

**The Antitrust Division 07** – Law enforcement agency that enforces the U.S. antitrust laws

“Antitrust Division Statement Regarding the Release of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report,” The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, April 2007, https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press\_releases/2007/222344.htm

The AMC has made many specific recommendations in its report, and the Division is in the process of reviewing all of them. The Division commends the AMC for its three primary conclusions:

Free-market competition should remain the touchstone of United States' economic policy. The Commission's conclusion in this regard is a fundamental starting point for policy makers. Over a century of experience has shown that robust competition among businesses, each striving to be increasingly successful, leads to better quality products and services, lower prices, and higher levels of innovation.

The **core antitrust laws**—**Sherman Act sections 1 and 2** and **Clayton Act section 7**—and their application by the courts and federal enforcement agencies are sound and appropriately safeguard the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

New or different rules are not needed for industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological innovation are central features. Unlike some other areas of the law, the core antitrust laws are **general in nature** and have been **applied to many different industries** to protect free-market competition successfully over a long period of time despite changes in the economy and the increasing pace of technological advancement. One of the great benefits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is their **adaptability** to **new economic conditions** without sacrificing their ability to protect competition.

**Expanding the scope requires Congressional action**

**King 19** – Attorney, BurnsBarton PLC

Kathryn Hackett King, Defendants State of Arizona, Davidson, and Shannon’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Toomey v. State of Arizona, et al., US District Court for the District of Arizona, January 2019, LexisNexis

In Title VII, Congress made clear it was unlawful for an employer to discriminate “because of sex.” Plaintiff claims the State Defendants discriminated against him because of his transgender status, but as explained in the Motion (with supporting case law), (i) courts cannot expand Title VII without congressional action, and (ii) Congress has repeatedly had the opportunity to enact legislation to add gender identity to Title VII, but has not done so. (Doc. 24, p.9-10). Plaintiff cannot refute that when Title VII does not protect a particular category, legislative action is required to change that.5 Plaintiff argues Congress’s failure to enact new legislation to add gender identity is not relevant because later acts of Congress are not probative of prior legislative intent. But the point is that **expanding** the **scope** of a **federal statute requires congressional**, **not judicial**, **action**. Gunnison v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (“Further expansion of the favored treatment specifically provided in §402(a)(2) as an exercise of legislative grace is a **function for the Congress**, **not for the Courts**”). Yet here, Congress has failed to act to expand Title VII. Congress’s failure to act demonstrates Title VII does not include unenumerated categories. Bibby v. Phil. Coca Cola, 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society….Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such harassment”).

**“Prohibitions” are laws that forbid action**

**Sweet 03** – Judge, United States District Court, New York Southern

Robert W. Sweet, Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Mirasco, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 303, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, March 2003, LexisNexis

In any case, even if the word "embargo" does not stretch so far, there is no doubt that the restriction against the importation of all IBP goods constitutes a "prohibition" under Clause D. HN15 "**Prohibition**" is defined by **Black's Law Dictionary** to be "a **law or order** that **forbids a certain action**." Black's Law Dictionary 1228 (7th ed. 1999). The dictionary definition is similar: "a **declaration** or **injunction forbidding some action**." Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1978 (2d ed. 1944). The common understanding of the word "prohibition" has similar connotations, with one exception. As Mirasco points out, any governmental action -- including the rejection on which insurance coverage is based -- could potentially be deemed a prohibition under the definitions above as a declaration forbidding the entry of goods. Therefore, a **prohibition** must be **qualitatively different** from a **rejection**. That difference is that the **prohibition occurs prior to** the government's dealing with the **specific** cargo at issue and is of a **more sweeping nature** than the **simple administrative function** performed by customs officials determining whether or not goods should be permitted into the country. Decree # 6 is such a prohibition, in that it was a **law or declaration** -- **issued prior to**, **separate from and broader than** the Egyptian authorities' administrative determination of whether the M/V Spero cargo should be permitted entry -- that forbids the importation of IBP products.

#### 2 impacts---

**[1]---Burdens---the affirmative has failed to meet their burden to prove the resolution is true---that necessitates voting negative because there is no rational basis for voting aff---the neg should not be expected to uphold their burden of rejoinder sans a topical aff because neg ground is inherently reactionary and reliant upon the aff meeting their burden first. Winning the ballot is thus concomitant with the acceptance of the undergirding structure of resolutional debate to give coherence to the ballot**

**It’s an impact---debate is not monolithic, but we each have a reason for participating in this debate that is important to us---absent a structure that provides logical meaning to things like pairings, judges, speech times, and ballots, the activity ceases to exist which forecloses the ability for anybody to realize their own imbued value in it**

**[2]---Incentives---abdicating the resolution allows the aff to call shotgun on truth and monopolize the moral high ground, but our model guarantees negative teams can be prepared for and have substantive answers to any 1AC---that creates sustainable and prolonged engagement over the course of a year, which is a better internal link to solving their aff, but that can only happen via a predictable structure of debate**

### K---1NC

Radical Politics K---

#### Their affirmation leads to abstraction and hubris as an end in itself – radical democratic politics is the only way to attack underlying logics of power

Smulewicz-Zucker, Editor of Logos and adjunct professor of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY, and Thompson, Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, ‘15

(Gregory and Michael J., “Introduction,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, pg. 1-32)

Radical politics in contemporary Western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is **found wanting**. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, **new journals have emerged** touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and subfields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political**, social, and cultural criticism** of the kind that once made progressive **and rational left political discourse** relevant **to the** machinations of real politics **and the broader culture** . Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity—from the workers’ movement to the civil rights movement—**possess a** critical mass **to sustain future struggles.** Quite to the contrary, **social movements have lost political momentum**; they are generally focused on questions of culture and shallow discussions of class and **obsessed with issues of identity**— racial, sexual, and so on—rather than on the great “social question” **of unequal** economic power, which once served as the driving impulse for political, social, and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy, **economic inequality has ballooned into** oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups turned into a coolie labor force.

This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the Left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades—a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence **of the tradition of progressive politics in our age.** At a time when the Left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber, and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, **postcolonialism**, and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties **wrought by late capitalism,** further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose.

The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to postindustrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others **ought not to be a** basic political imperative**.** To this end, what we would call a rational radical politics should **seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics**, but rather to enrich common goods, **erode the great divisions of wealth and class,** **democratize all aspects of society and economy**, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor **and rethinking the ends of the labor movement**—connecting the struggles of labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, p**ublic life, issues of** racial **and** gender equality, culture, and the nature of the social order more broadly—can we envision a revitalization of a workers’ movement, one **that would have no need of the** alienated theory **of the new radicals**.1

#### Political refusal finds comfort in the fulfillment of individual demands --- this accepts as a given the powerlessness of the left, depoliticizing any concrete power struggles --- radical movements must become political to combat climate change, fascism, and rampant inequality.

Dorman 16

Peter Dorman, Faculty in the Political Economy Department at Evergreen State College, “The Climate Movement Needs to Get Radical, but What Does that Mean?,” Nonsite. May 26, 2016. http://nonsite.org/editorial/the-climate-movement-needs-to-get-radical-but-what-does-that-mean

2. The cultural turn has gone too far. Of course, the deciphering of discourses has much to recommend it; all social action takes place in a context of meanings—shared, contested or both. It’s remarkable, however, that a high profile book that claims to be about radical social change, and which has won widespread approval across the leftward half of the political spectrum, could sidestep any sustained consideration of wealth and power altogether.

Why have governments failed to act to counter the threat of catastrophic climate change? Is it solely because of faulty thinking, or could it be that there exists a gross imbalance of power in every modern capitalist country, such that business interests are firmly in control? What institutions wield this power and what methods do they use? Crucially, how can those who struggle for democratic collective action contest this power? What types of organizations can be effective? What structural changes should be prioritized to rebalance power and enable rational solutions to overriding problems like climate change? I wouldn’t fault Klein for failing to provide answers—who has? What is astonishing, however, is that the questions are never posed, not even in passing. What does it mean to espouse radical politics and never take up the issue of power?

But a second absence is even more telling. At variou–s points Klein refers to the need for a price to be placed on carbon; it clearly is not her main interest, since she devotes no space at all to the political struggle required to achieve this, but she recognizes it is an important part of the story. What’s missing, however, is any serious consideration of how much money this will be, out of whose pockets it will be extracted and to whose pockets it will be transferred. I cannot emphasize how extraordinary it is for a book to be ostensibly about capitalism but pay so little attention to money.

The reality is that carbon revenues will be immense. If even approximately sufficient global action is undertaken, the sums will be in the trillions of dollars. And despite Klein’s moral calculus, the actual, real-life operation of carbon pricing will guarantee that it is the public at large—everyone who purchases a good or service with a carbon energy component—that will pay it. This is visible in gasoline taxes today, which consumers pay at the pump; a carbon price, whether it is engineered by a tax or a cap on permits, will be the same sort of tax writ very, very large. Such a tax will be regressive, and lower income people will effectively be taxed at a higher rate.

This is potentially catastrophic on multiple levels. It is intolerable from a social justice perspective in an age of rampaging inequality. It would also be impossible to disguise from voters, making it difficult to impossible to get majority support for a stiff carbon price. Klein blithely recommends using this new source of revenue to finance green investments, but she doesn’t inquire whose money is being spent, nor does she consider that, in practice, governments will simply shift a lot of the investments they would have made anyway over to this new revenue spigot, freeing up more money for their other pet projects. The one word that sums up Klein’s attitude toward this trillion-dollar question is uninterested.

Of course, there are ways to turn around the economics of carbon pricing. The money can be returned to the public on an equal per capita basis, which would have the effect of turning an otherwise regressive transfer system into a progressive, inequality-reducing one. Given the amount of money at stake, this will require a massive political mobilization, but it is worth fighting for. To repeat, however, the purpose of bringing up this issue is not to proselytize for a different system of carbon pricing, but simply to point out the glaring incongruity of an ostensibly radical, anti-capitalist book (a rather long one at that) which ignores the single most important principle for how things work in a capitalist society: follow the money!

3. The left has adapted to powerlessness. This Changes Everything practically exudes triumphalism, especially in the final hundred pages or so. Vibrant, righteous movements are springing up everywhere, we are told, and through their proliferation they will change the world.

Except, of course, they won’t. They do not have the means to change the world to something different, only to obstruct the bits of the existing world they can get their bodies in front of. That is important to do, and it can play a crucial role in a larger movement to contest power—if that movement can come into existence. If no larger movement arises, the local fires will be put out one by one. A radical political vision cannot abjure politics, and it is politics which is missing from Klein.

Here it is necessary to step back and consider the historical context. In the English-speaking world, and to a lesser extent in other wealthy, capitalist countries, the past several decades have seen profound defeat and demobilization on the left. In no country is there a mass political party with a program to transform the existing political economic order into something else. Unions, where they have any clout at all, have been fighting a rearguard struggle to retain as many of the gains of former times as they can. Of course, there have also been substantial victories for racial, gender and other social equalities and a general drift toward less authoritarian cultural norms. But the core institutions of wealth and power are more firmly entrenched now than they have been in generations, and the left as a political force is hardly noticeable.

How have those who still identify with the left coped with this epoch of powerlessness? There are many answers, but all of them express some form of disengagement. For instance, redefining politics as the performance of moral virtue rather than the contest for power can provide consolation when political avenues appear to be blocked. Activities of this sort are evaluated according to how expressive they are—how good they make us feel—rather than any objective criterion of effectiveness in achieving concrete goals or altering the balance of political forces. This is how I would interpret Blockadia, for instance, in the absence of a broader movement that includes both direct action and political contestation: Klein can devote page after page to how righteous these activists are without any attention to whether they have had or have any prospect of having an impact on carbon emissions. Their very activism constitutes its own victory, which is convenient if the more conventional sort of victory is believed to be out of reach. (It is bad form to even bring this up: why, some will ask, am I dwelling on the negative with so much positive energy to celebrate?)

Another response is to collapse social change into personal choices over lifestyle and philosophy. If you believe that the threat of climate change can be defeated by a shift to more modest consumption habits and rejection of the false intellectual gods of globalization and economic growth, one individual at a time, then each moment of conversion constitutes its own little victory. The reader of Klein’s book, feeling a sense of unity with that consciousness and its program to downshift consumption, can experience this victory first hand. This is very gratifying, and it reinforces the message that powerlessness in conventional terms is irrelevant, since the change we are part of is at a deeper level than governments and their laws or corporations and their assets. After all, what can be more subversive than thinking new thoughts?

One of Klein’s favorite adaptations is the conflation of wishes and operative political programs. Again and again she holds up statements of intent—protect Mother Earth, treat all people equally, respect all cultures, live simple, natural, local lives—as if they were proposals whose implementation would have these outcomes. It’s all ends and no means. This is a double convenience: first it eliminates the need to be factual and analytical about programs, since announcing the goal is sufficient unto itself, and second, it evades the disconcerting problem of how to deal with the daunting political challenge of getting such programs (if they even exist) enacted and enforced. I believe the treatment of goals as if they were programs is the underlying reason for the sloppiness of this book on matters of economics and law. Klein can say we should finance a large green investment program by taxing fossil fuel profits, or we should simultaneously shrink the economy and increase the number of jobs, because in the end it doesn’t matter whether these or other recommendations could actually prove functional in the real world. The truth lies in the rightness of the demand, not the means of fulfilling it. But this too is an adaptation to powerlessness.

To close, I wish to emphasize that this critique is ultimately not directed at a single individual. On the contrary, even if we consider only this one book, it is clear that its writing was a team effort; the long acknowledgments section identifies both paid assistants and an army of internal reviewers. But what I find diagnostic is the warm reception it received from virtually every media outlet on the English-speaking left. This suggests that Klein is moving with the political tide and not against it, and that the problems that seemed obvious to me were either invisible to her reviewers or regarded as too insignificant to bring up. The view that capitalism is a style of thinking, progress is a myth, and political contestation is irrelevant to “true” social change belongs not just to this one book but to all the commentators who found nothing to criticize. That’s the real problem.

#### Unfettered neoliberalism leads to mass violence and environmental destruction – radical engagements towards institutional change are key

Rees, professor at the University of British Columbia’s School of Community and Regional Planning, originator of “ecological footprint analysis,” founding member and former president of the Canadian Society for Ecological Economics, ‘15

(William, “Economics vs. the Economy,” http://www.greattransition.org/publication/economics-vs-the-economy)

Economic theories, though social constructions, can reflect reality to varying degrees. **In the face of** dire environmental challenges, **adopting a** realistic theory **is key to the** survival of global civilization. The neoliberal emphasis on limitless growth and monetary flows, a relic of nineteenth century thinking, **abstracts away from biological conditions**. By contrast, ecological economics—as distinct from environmental economics, which remains wedded to the neoliberal growth paradigm—understands the economy as a subsystem of the ecosphere and envisions a steady-state economy embedded **within natural constraints**. Achieving this equitably **will require significant redistribution** of wealth and income, reduction of material throughput, and a transition away from fossil fuels. Although the neoliberal paradigm remains dominant, its lack of fitness to current realities gives hope that an ecological alternative could ascend.

Social Constructs and Social Reality

Is there anything we can say about economics that takes us beyond pure “conjecture”? How can we tell whether one theorist’s interpretation of the economic process **is any “better” than another’s?**

These questions are not as simple as they seem. Of the many unique qualities that set Homo sapiens apart from other sentient beings, one of the most important is that we humans tend to create our own “realities.” To be more precise, we make up stories about almost everything, give tenacity to these stories through social discourse and repetition, and then “act out” the stories as if they were reality. Tribal myths, religious doctrines, political ideologies, academic paradigms, and grand cultural narratives are just some of the fabrications that can make or ruin individual lives and set the course for whole societies. Sociologists call the general phenomenon the “social construction of reality” (though it would be more accurate to refer to the social construction of shared perceptions). The fact of “social construction” provides a useful frame through which to assess the relative merits of neoliberal growth economics versus Herman Daly’s steady-state ecological economics for a full world.1

To begin, it is important to distinguish between “the economy” and “economics.” Both are made-up concepts, but with a significant difference. We define the economy as that set of activities by which human agents identify, develop/exploit, process, and trade in scarce resources. It generally encompasses everything associated with the production, allocation, exchange, and consumption of valuable goods and services, including the behavior of various agents engaged in economic activity. Different economies vary considerably in sophistication and organizational structure. However, **all economies are** real phenomena; people in every human society from primitive tribes through modern nation-states engage in economic activities as defined.

“Economics,” by contrast, **is pure abstraction**. It is that academic discipline dedicated to dissecting, analyzing, modeling, and otherwise describing the economy in simplified terms. Academic economists engage in the social construction of formalized models—verbal and arithmetic “paradigms”—about how the real economy works.

In fact, economists have advanced various competing economic paradigms to describe our modern, techno-industrial, mainly capitalist national and global economies. These differ substantially in terms of foundational principles, analytic tools, systemic scope, conclusions, and policy implications, particularly where the biophysical “environment” is concerned. This diversity should be no surprise: whatever their seeming conceptual elegance and analytic rigor, every economic paradigm is, at bottom, a socially-constructed figment of the human imagination, one that necessarily reflects the starting beliefs, values, and assumptions of its authors. And beliefs, values, and assumptions vary a great deal.

These insights should give us pause. Paradigms of all kinds, even those with demonstrably sketchy origins, assert enormous power over expressed human behavior. Indeed, it is truly remarkable that individuals and whole societies live in the real biophysical world guided by the parameters of various myths, paradigms, social norms, and cultural narratives that may have only a tenuous grip on that same reality.

This brings us back to wondering how reasonable people might choose between neoliberal growth economics and steady-state economics, particularly in a time of ecological turmoil. Postmodernists of the extreme relativist persuasion might argue that, **since all knowledge is socially constructed**, **there is no objective reality.** **Competing paradigms are therefore equally valid** (as in “my vision of the economy is as good as yours!”). This is dangerously wrong-headed: humans construct only their beliefs, not reality. **Relativistic equivalence** is itself a constructed fiction. Culture critic Neil Postman astutely observed, “You may say, if you wish, that all reality [i.e., perception] is social construction, but you cannot deny **that some constructions are ‘**truer’ than others**.** **They are not ‘truer’ because they are privileged; they are privileged because they are ‘truer.’**”2

To be clear, we should acknowledge that **many social constructs are pure illusion** with no counterpart in nature (e.g., the tooth fairy or the notion of a fiery hell); others specify entities that actually exist in total indifference to how people conceive of them (e.g., the law of gravity or the biogeochemical **cycling of nutrients**). Postman is referring to constructs in the latter category. All social constructions of real phenomena are conceptual models, **but a “truer” model will be supported by** tangible evidence, not opinion or wishful thinking. “**Truer” constructions are** better maps **that more fully and faithfully represent the real-world landscapes they purport to represent.**

It is also important to recognize that while belief in some illusory constructs (e.g., “the sun rises in the East”) is inconsequential, allegiance to **others can determine the fates of nations**. **How a society conceives of its economy**, for example, really matters. Indeed, operating from a realistic economic paradigm may even be a key to the survival of global civilization.

Neoliberal Mechanics or Eco-thermodynamics?

So, what do we know about real-world economic activities that might guide us in constructing a “true” economic paradigm? By “true,” I mean one that, among other requirements, adequately reflects the energy/material flows and biophysical processes basic to all living things, including human beings. It is not an exaggeration to say that such a paradigm is a matter of survival. After all, the human system functions like a multi-cellular organism except that, in addition to our bio-metabolic demands, we also have to account for humanity’s unique industrial metabolism. Six facts about humanity and the natural world seem particularly relevant:

1. All human economies are confined to planet Earth, i.e., they function within the ecosphere.

2. The entire human enterprise—our physical bodies, our possessions, and the infrastructure needed to maintain the functional integrity of the whole—is made from energy and materials that we extract from ecosystems and inanimate nature (i.e., from self-producing and non-renewable forms of so-called “natural capital”).

3. All energy and material flows/processes associated with economic activity are governed by well-known laws of physics and chemistry.

4. Real economies, societies, and ecosystems **are complex systems characterized** by lags, thresholds, and other forms of nonlinear behavior (complex systems dynamics) that make their trajectories under stress inherently difficult to predict.

5. The energy and material pathways associated with the acquisition of resources and the disposal of wastes require people to interact with both other species (ecosystems) and inanimate nature. In fact, a qualitative and quantitative record of these flows would describe humanity’s material ecological niche; the goods economy roughly maps the human ecosystem.

6. **The ecosphere is a finite entity with variable**, **but ultimately limited, regenerative and waste assimilation capacities.**

The next question is, how well do mainstream economics and Daly’s ecological economics respectively incorporate these framing constraints? The short answer for the neoliberal paradigm is “virtually not at all.” The dominant economics in this twenty-first century of increasing ecological turmoil is a relic of nineteenth century thinking. Its intellectual founders, motivated by the remarkable success of Newtonian physics, set out explicitly to model economics as the “mechanics of utility and self-interest.” The discipline consequently lost sight of the social context and purpose of economies and became totally abstracted from biological reality. Practitioners increasingly based their models on mechanical cause-effect logic and other simplistic assumptions in the service of analytic tractability. Growth through efficiency gradually became its raison d’être.

Analytic mechanics may have been a suitable platform for the design of early automobile engines, but it is grossly inadequate to reflect the lags, tipping points, multiple equilibria, irreversible transformations, and other complex dynamics of industrial economies or of the social and ecological systems within which they are embedded. However, since the scale of human activity relative to “the environment” was initially negligible, neoclassical economists were able to ignore biophysical context with impunity until the 1960s.

As pollution and general eco-dysfunction finally **became embarrassingly visible** (giving birth to modern environmentalism), the mainstream response was “environmental economics,” essentially an extension of the neoclassical growth-based paradigm. If environmental assets were being degraded, the solution was to monetize nature and let free markets do their magic. Put a price on pollution (i.e., “internalize the externalities”) and depend on market and technological efficiency gains to ease resource scarcity. Where that fails, human ingenuity, stimulated by rising prices**, will find substitutes for any failing good or service provided by nature.** As Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow famously wrote, “[t]he world can, in effect, get along without natural resources.”3 There was no perceived need to question the structural premises of the neoliberal model or its goal of unending growth through efficiency and technological progress. There are arguably no constraints on human ingenuity.

### Case

**The aff fails---it cannot change mindsets.**

Thomas **Wiedmann et al. 20**, Sustainability Assessment Program, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, UNSW Sydney; Manfred Lenzen, ISA, School of Physics, The University of Sydney; Lorenz T. KeyßEr, Institute for Environmental Decisions, Department of Environmental Systems Science, ETH Zürich; Julia K. Steinberger, Sustainability Research Institute (SRI), School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, "Scientists’ Warning on Affluence," Nature Communications, Vol. 11, 06/19/2020, Springer.

Growth imperatives are active at **multiple levels**, making the **pursuit** of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a **necessity** for **different** actors and leading to **social** and **economic** instability in the absence of it7,52,60. Following a Marxian perspective as put forward by Pirgmaier and Steinberger61, growth imperatives can be attributed to capitalism as the currently dominant socio-economic system in affluent countries7,51,62, although this is debated by other scholars52. To structure this topic, we will discuss different affected actors separately, namely corporations, states and individuals, following Richters and Siemoneit60. Most importantly, we address the role of the super-affluent consumers within a society, which overlap with **powerful fractions** of the capitalist class. From a Marxian perspective, this social class is **structurally** defined by its position in the capitalist production process, as **financially tied with the function of capital**63. In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.

Even though some small- and medium-sized businesses manage to refrain from pursuing growth, e.g. due to a low competition intensity in niche markets, or lack of financial debt imperatives, this cannot be said for most firms64. In capitalism, firms need to **compete** in the market, leading to a **necessity to reinvest profits** into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), **innovation** of new products and/or **advertising** to convince consumers to buy more7,61,62. As a result, the average energy intensity of labour is now twice as high as in 195060. As long as a firm has a competitive **advantage**, there is a strong incentive to sell as much as possible. Financial markets are **crucial to enable this constant expansion** by providing (interest-bearing) capital and channelling it where it is most profitable58,61,63. If a firm fails to stay competitive, it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics7,62,63,65.

However, two factors exist that further **strengthen** this growth dynamic60. Firstly, if labour productivity continuously rises, then **aggregate economic growth** becomes **necessary** to keep employment constant, otherwise technological unemployment results. This creates one of the imperatives for capitalist states to **foster** aggregate growth, since with **worsening** economic conditions and high unemployment, tax revenues shrink, e.g. from labour and value-added taxes, while **social security** expenditures rise60,62. Adding to this, states compete with other states **geopolitically** and in providing **favourable** conditions for capital, while capitalists have the resources to influence political decisions in their favour. If economic conditions are expected to deteriorate, e.g. due to unplanned recession or progressive political change, firms can threaten capital **flight**, financial markets **react** and investor as well as consumer confidence shrink51,58,60. Secondly, consumers usually **increase** their consumption in tune with increasing production60. This process can be at least in part explained by substantial advertising efforts by firms47,52,66. However, further mechanisms are at play as explained further below.

Following this analysis, it is not surprising that the growth paradigm is **hegemonic**, i.e. the perception that economic growth solves **all kinds of societal problems**, that it equals **progress**, **power** and **welfare** and that it can be made practically endless through some form of supposedly **green or sustainable** growth59. Taken together, the described dynamics create **multiple** dependencies of workers, firms and states on a well-functioning capital accumulation and thus wield more **material**, **institutional** and **discursive** power (e.g. for political lobbying) to capitalists who are usually the most affluent consumers61,67. Even if different fractions of the capitalist class have manifold and competing interests which need to be constantly renegotiated, there is a **common interest in maintaining** the capitalist system and favourable conditions for capital accumulation, e.g. through aggregate growth and high consumption51,62. How this **political corruption** by the super-affluent plays out in practice is **well documented**, e.g. for the meat industry in Denmark6.

Super-affluent consumers drive consumption norms

Growth imperatives and drivers (with the latter describing less coercive mechanisms to increase consumption) can also be active at the **individual level**. In this case, the level of consumption can **serve** as a proxy47,60,68. To start with, individual consumption decisions are not **made in a vacuum**, but are shaped by **surrounding** (physical and social) structures and provisioning systems47,61,69. Sanne66 and Alexander47 discuss several **structural barriers to sufficiency-oriented lifestyles**, locking in **high** consumption. These include lack of **suitable housing**, insufficient options for **socialising**, **employment**, **transport** and **information**, as well as high exposure to **consumer temptations**. Often, these conditions are **deliberately** fostered by states and also capitalists (the latter overlapping with super-affluent consumers and having disproportionate influence on states) to increase consumption61,66.

Further active mechanisms to spur growth include positional and efficiency consumption, which contribute to an increase in consumption overall52,60,68,70. After basic material needs are satisfied, an increasing proportion of consumption is directed at positional goods52,70. The defining feature of these goods is that they are expensive and signify social status. Access to them depends on the income relative to others. **Status matters**, since **empirical** studies show that currently relative income is one of the strongest determinants of individual happiness52. In the aggregate however, the pursuit of positional consumption, driven by super-affluent consumers and high inequalities, likely resembles a zero-sum game with respect to societal wellbeing70,71. With every actor striving to increase their position relative to their peers, the average consumption level rises and thus even **more expensive positional goods** become necessary, while the societal wellbeing level stagnates42,71. This is supported by a large body of **empirical research**, showing that an individual’s happiness correlates positively with their own income but negatively with the peer group’s income71 and that **unequal** access to positional goods fosters rising consumption52. This endless process is a core part of capitalism as it keeps **social momentum** and **consumption** high with affluent consumers driving aspirations and hopes of social ascent in low-affluence segments70,72. The positional consumption behaviour of the super-affluent thus drives consumption norms across the population, for instance through their excessive air travel, as documented by Gössling73.

Lastly, in capitalism, workers must **compete** against each other in the labour market in order to earn a living from capitalists7,63. Following Siemoneit68, this can lead to a similar **imperative to net invest** (increase the level of consumption/investment) as is observed with capitalists. In order to stay competitive, individuals are pushed to increase **time** and **cost efficiency** by investing in cars, kitchen appliances, computers and smartphones, by using social media and online trade etc. This efficiency consumption—effectively another facet of the rebound effect38,47,68—helps to manage high workloads, thus **securing an income**, while maintaining private life. This is often accompanied by trends of **commodification**61, understood as the marketisation of products and services which used to be provisioned through more time-intensive commons or reciprocal social arrangements, e.g. convenience food vs. cooking together. As in the food example74, this replacement of human labour with energy- and material-intensive industrial production typically increases environmental pressures47,75. Through these economic pressures, positive feedback loops and lock-ins are expected to emerge, since other consumers need to keep up with these investments or face disadvantages, e.g. when car or smartphone ownership become presupposed. Taken together with **positional consumption**, structural barriers to **sufficiency** and the substantial **advertising efforts** by capitalists, these mechanisms explain to a large extent why consumers seem so willing to increase their consumption in accordance with increasing production60.

**And movements get cracked down on**

**Wainer and Bienenfeld 19** – Kit Wainer is a member of the United Federation of Teachers and is active in the opposition caucus, the Movement of Rank and File Educators. Mel Bienenfeld is a longtime socialist activist and recently retired president of a higher-education teachers local union.

(Kate Griffiths, 7-21-2019, "Problems with an Electoral Road to Socialism in the United States," New Politics, https://newpol.org/issue\_post/problems-with-an-electoral-road-to-socialism-in-the-united-states/)

Governors control the National Guard and state police. Local governments control local police forces, although the Constitution allows states full discretion to limit the autonomy of localities. While the president may federalize the guard for a period of time, **it is easy to imagine guard generals refusing to obey presidential authority when asked to enforce decisions the courts have ruled unconstitutional**. Of course a president can send the army into states, thus violating the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, but it is similarly easy to envision generals refusing to execute orders on solid constitutional grounds, or the officer corps dividing amongst itself, in that scenario. In short **there would be no way** of overcoming state recalcitrance **to implement socialist legislation without destroying the legitimacy of the constitutional order.**

In fact, not only can **state authorities** resist**, they can also repress**. Partial socialist victories in the electoral arena would inevitably yield a **fractured state,** with critical parts still in the hands of pro-capitalist officials. The latter would be constitutionally authorized to arrest and terrorize mass movement activists who threaten their rule. They have, after all, done so numerous times in U.S. history. Even today, federal and state authorities are far more likely to arrest someone for the crime of being an immigrant or person of color than for marching with an armed fascist gang threatening the annihilation of the Jews. **Mass movements that are not prepared to physically confront and defeat armed authorities would stand little chance.**

Bureaucracy, the Regulatory Process, and Unelected Authority

While the legislative and executive branches make law and the judicial branch reviews laws, unelected regulatory bodies determine how they are actually interpreted and implemented. Currently, these bodies are staffed by skilled bureaucrats through a combination of patronage, political favoritism, and civil service promotion. Regulatory agencies are typically staffed by and managed by the industries they are designed to regulate. Even lower-level bureaucratic posts often enable employees to audition for far more lucrative private-sector employment. This creates enormous incentives to defer to corporate prerogative, even if the elected authorities have a different agenda. And these regulatory agencies decide what the law means in day-to-day situations that lawmakers can never predict when writing bills.

Bureaucratic and regulatory agencies govern at the local, state, and federal levels. They set zoning policies that largely determine whether housing is affordable and safe for working-class habitation. Their rules indirectly affect how much of their lives working people spend commuting to and from work because where tall buildings are built often determines which neighborhoods are clogged with traffic. As with regulatory agencies, building departments are typically instruments of real estate developers, even if they do protect occupants’ safety to some extent. Unelected bodies, such as public authorities in New York and New Jersey, typically control public transportation and critical infrastructure, and an army of bureaucrats runs the education systems all over the United States. All of these bureaucratic agencies are susceptible to intense pressure from highly paid lobbyists. Conditions of housing, transportation, public health, and education are some of the most powerful forces shaping workers’ daily lives, and it is difficult to imagine how working people would maintain confidence in and enthusiasm for a workers’ government that could not demonstrably improve those aspects of their lives. It is also difficult to see how a government could make significant headway in those areas without breaking apart the relevant bureaucracies and busting up the private-sector lobbying firms that influence them. In short, the very precondition for sustained radical electoral success would require the demolition of most regulatory organizations and their replacement with democratic and accountable bodies.

Unelected bureaucracy also reigns in the area of foreign policy. While major decisions such as going to or avoiding war, or negotiating trade agreements, are in the hands of elected officials, many of the day-to-day details of foreign relations are decided and implemented by career officials who are similarly subjected to substantial corporate lobbying and use foreign service careers as springboards into highly paid private-sector employment. The State Department routinely approves international trade licenses, contacts foreign bureaucrats on behalf of U.S. firms, and utilizes personal relationships with international counterparts to smooth those processes. In a world in which several major capitalist states still rule and the U.S. state is fractured, these bureaucrats could become key links between global and domestic counter-revolution.

While bureaucracy takes different forms in different countries, career civil servants staff the state apparatus in most capitalist states today. They tend to be ideologically committed to the survival of the state. Their career ambitions also depend on the patronage of higher ups in each department and alliances with private capitalists who hold the key to their promotion both inside and outside the public sector.

Can bureaucracy be subordinated to a workers’ government? Yes. In fact the soviet state had no choice but to rely on sectors of the tsarist bureaucracy both to win the civil war and for government administration in the 1920s. In a scenario in which the capitalist class has been fully defeated, disempowered bureaucrats might well decide, one by one, that cooperation with the new workers’ regime represents the only hope for maintaining their careers. However, the “democratic,” or, more accurately, the electoral, road to socialism leads inevitably along a different path. It does not deliver a sudden, decisive defeat to the state or to the ruling class. Quite the contrary, it leads to what might be termed “dual power,” in which socialists rule over substantial sectors of the government but capitalist politicians dominate others and much of the capitalist state bureaucracy remains intact. The police, fearing that their careers are in jeopardy, would likely continue to repress mass movements and fight at all costs to preserve their positions. These institutions of the capitalist state would also have powerful allies in the judiciary, not to mention support from capitalists around the world. Under that scenario it is highly unlikely that the administrative bureaucracies would place themselves at the service of workers’ regimes who have far less to offer them and from whom they have far less to fear.

Throughout U.S. history the labor movement and other **radical reform movements have had to contend with ferocious and violent counterattacks**. After World War I, socialists, anarchists, and labor activists of various stripes faced intense state repression. The **survival o**f U.S. **capitalism was not in question** at this time. **Yet, the federal government responded with mass arrests**, deportations, frame-ups, **and violence.** After World War II, federal and state governments effectively repressed the radical wings of the labor movement with witch hunts and blacklists, while tolerating rampant racist violence. It is important to note that **the Communist Party** **not only**, at this point, **could not have threatened revolution, its orientation was heavily electoral**. But the mere prospect of a more militant labor movement and a radical electoral alternative was something both Democrats and Republicans were determined to repress. In the 1960s the FBI’s Cointelpro program targeted movement activists and even murdered Black Panther leader Fred Hampton.

A workers movement in the United States must prepare for severe state repression or it will succumb to it. At times this may involve operating clandestinely. It may also require active self-defense against legal authorities or fascist paramilitaries. Most importantly, preparation means educating a generation of socialist and labor activists about how and why the state protects capitalist profitability both through its own constitutional mechanisms and often with repressive measures that violate its own legality.

#### Approaches that center mutual aid aren’t sustainable and fuel an individualistic fantasy where we fail to make durable changes to institutions

Wuest 20 – Joanna Wuest holds the Fund for Reunion–Cotsen Postdoctoral Fellowship in LGBT Studies and is a lecturer at Princeton University. She studies and writes on the politics of identity and inequality.

Joanna Wuest, December 16 2020, “Mutual Aid Can’t Do It Alone,” The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/society/mutual-aid-pandemic-covid/

As the United States went into lockdown last spring, the country entered a pandemic-induced recession with scant social protections. Faced with a hollowed-out welfare state and inadequate relief from the federal government’s initial stimulus, Americans had no choice but to rely on the generosity of their neighbors, friends, and colleagues. Since March, people from weekend volunteers to full-time anarchists have done extraordinary things to distribute food staples and provide shelter for those who found themselves hungry and homeless. Still, given that nearly a quarter of American households with children are carrying rental debt and that a permanent exodus of the poor and working class from major urban hubs is underway, such efforts are confined mainly to the margins.

Weathering the current crisis requires nurturing useful hope while avoiding palliative delusions. That means ditching our magical thinking about the sustainability of those mass mobilizations of goodwill that make the nightly news and pepper the pages of left-wing periodicals (both of which neglect the fact that charitable giving actually plummets during recessions). It also means recognizing that crises are excellent opportunities for revanchist right-wing forces to further raze state institutions and slam the lid on cries for justice. When labor-left movements were strong and could afford to go on the offense, the Great Depression created an opening for reform. If there is a lesson from mutual aid’s role in these past triumphs, it is that such community work was subordinated to the tasks of invigorating trade unions and pushing the state to enact universal programs.

Kropotkin was not wrong about our natural inclination to cooperate. But how we organize and nurture that cooperative instinct is crucial. A crisis can bring us together to rebuild durable structures for the collective good. It can also exacerbate the dog-eat-dog mentality that neoliberalism has cultivated for decades. Our country is coming to resemble a long-sought libertarian fantasy, with only atomized acts of compassion for those left out. We would do well to guard against this despotic individualism—the natural condition of the social without the state—and to be sober about what spurred this renaissance of mutual aid and what it portends.

#### Independently, their refusal to defend anything is exactly what makes nouveau radicalism so useless

**Smulewicz-Zucker**, Editor of Logos and adjunct professor of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY, **and Thompson**, Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, **‘15**

(Gregory and Michael J., “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” <http://logosjournal.com/2015/thompson-zucker/>)

But this is merely one fringe expression of what we see as a corrupted, simplified and de-politicized “new” radicalism. Once grounded in the Enlightenment impulse for progress, equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now **evade** the concrete nature of these concerns. The battles that raged in the 1980s and 1990s between postmodernists and defenders of modernity – while serving as a harbinger of the contemporary split between the radical theorists divorced from reality and those who seek to establish anti-foundationalist conceptions of democratic discourse – were attached to a strong sense that the future of rationalism and radical politics hung in the balance. Today’s radical intellectuals **do not feel compelled to defend their arguments** **or respond to their critics.** Their purported radicalism becomes all the more **opaque** when the coherence of their claims is called into question. A concern for an exaggerated **subjectivity**, **identity politics**, **anti-empirical theories of power**, an **obsession with “difference**” – all serve to **deplete the radical tradition of its potency**. Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies, **invent new forms of “subjectivity**,” and concoct **new languages** of discourse that only serve to **splinter** forms of political resistance, **consigning radicalism to the depths of incoherence** and (academic success notwithstanding) **political irrelevance**.

Indeed, the disintegration of the great radical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – from the labor movement to the Civil Rights movement – has **detached philosophical thinking** **from the mechanisms of power and political reality more broadly**. The result has been – despite the ironic new turn toward “anti-philosophy” – the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy. **Abstraction has been the result**, as well as a panoply of **shibboleths** that have only served to **sever “radical” thought** from its relevance to contemporary politics and society. It seems to us that the survival of the tradition of rational, radical political and social criticism pivots on a confrontation with these new academic trends and fads.

**Hartman is too quick to reject manipulating the state to progressive ends – rejection is worse because it sacrifices fragile protections in the name of deterministic pessimism**

Harvey **Neptune 8**, Associate Professor of History at Temple, Loving Through Loss: Reading Saidiya Hartman’s History of Black Hurt, Anthurium 6:1

While there are tragically just reasons to recognize the limits of government as an instrument of emancipation, championing statelessness (as Hartman does) is not without great peril. Nation-states, as blacks all over can attest, continue to be shamefully unscrupulous guarantors of rights and privileges. Still, to exist outside of that global system can be fatally precarious**.** To be stateless at present is to be naked before government agencies possessed of a cold faith in documents and to be defenseless before armies empowered to detain and torture with immunity. Perhaps, Hartman meant to be metaphoric in employing the term “stateless,” for, although she includes herself in that category, the ironic truth is that the genuinely stateless tend to find themselves stuck**.** For non-citizens, the mobility Hartman boastsis nearly impossible or dearly dangerous. However weary of America, the author of Lose Your Mother, as a US citizen, could apply for a passport and with relative ease secure entry into scores of countries around the world. For the vast majority of the world, such trips belong to the realm of the wishful imagination. The very movement endorsed in Lose Your Mother, in other words, rests upon the author’s access to the sanctions of a powerful state.4 Might Hartman in the end be too quick to dismiss the state as a fruitful arena of freedom-centered politics? And might that be because her own biography allows her to take its protective and enabling aspects for granted? The author’s doubts about the cost of citizenship are not unthinking; in fact, they are deeply considered and are of a part with a mood putatively endemic to a generation. This cohort, goes the conventional wisdom, has been **paralyzed by pessimism** with regard to the potential for collectively transforming society. Having come of age too late for the idealism of civil rights and decolonization movements and having witnessed their reversals, corruptions and demises, they sit resigned, like belated guests to the party that promise to make the world anew.5 This generational paradigm should not go unquestioned**.** Its acceptance facilitates a fudging that allows individual thinkers to avoid dealing with the ambiguities and nuances of the political present and making tough contingent choices about appropriate **courses of action**. Lose Your Mother, insofar as it is framed as an offspring of a postcolonial melancholia or post civil rights despair, resurrects my wariness about this brand of soft demographic determinism. Hartman, of course, is too thoughtful to attribute her political disposition to some simple generational inheritance. Indeed, she explicitly acknowledges the possibility of adopting politics in a radically different key through her running engagement with another book, Robin Kelley’s Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination. A kind of foil for Lose Your Mother, this series of essays by a scholar roughly of Hartman’s generation mines a rich past of lesser-known black liberation struggles toward inspiring present-day radicals. And although Hartman confesses to harboring a secret wish to share Kelley’s optimism, her writing stops far short of the kind of hope that invigorates Freedom’s Dreams. This invocation of Kelley is pertinent; it is an admission that there is no necessary link between a post-sixties maturation and a political temperament resistant to hope. Indeed, one can only wonder how she regards another intellectual peer who has also written thoughtfully about self-making, politics and the black diaspora and whose rhetoric of hopes and dreams just might land him in the White House. The phenomenal ascendance of Barack Obama ought to serve as a cautionary tale for those who feel comfortable framing the present. Ours might not quite be the romantic age of black radicalism, but neither does it quite look like one of tragic defeat. If recent epochal political changes cannot explain straightforwardly the grimness that haunts Lose Your Mother, what does? Aware of this lurking question, Hartman responds by owning up to the book’s personal investments. The text’s discouraging darkness, she accepts, is deeply indicative of her stalking despair. Early, in fact, Hartman discloses that her interest in slavery is partially motivated by a belief that it has shaped the person she has become. The sad fates of those millions stolen, bought, sold, and killed, she is convinced, somehow find expression in her soul. Their death sentences compose her life’s story. As she concedes at one point, a grave in Africa marks the proper beginning for her autobiography. Yet this take on the connection between the author’s affective life and her writing on slavery is not the only valid one, perhaps not even the immediately obvious one. The logic might just as easily be reversed; in other words, it is no less credible to view the history Hartman has chosen to write as the product of the person she has become. Both forms of reasoning are legitimate and ultimately inseparable, belonging to a circle of causation. Still, each implies a different emphasis. The second approach, importantly, suspends the presumption about the appropriate point of entry for Hartman’s autobiography. It does not make slavery the self-evident start, leaving open the possibility of a story with a different timeline. This perspective could endorse training attention on Hartman’s lived experiences rather than on “history.” To what extent, for example, might her Brooklyn upbringing—and not the plight of fugitive slaves— better account for the melancholy that pervades her worldview. Lose Your Mother, however, does not entertain this kind of query. As autobiography, it tends to tease, remaining mostly guarded about the signal turns, eddies, erosions and falls that shaped the course of the author’s life. Saidiya, the text lets on, is a loner and can be argumentative, short-tempered and stubborn. We are at a loss, however, as to how she became that way.

**Institutions are deeply flawed but the narrative that all progress is a myth is ahistorical and locks in worse racial violence**

**Johnson 16** (Cedric, author of Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the Making of African American Politics and editor of The Neoliberal Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, Late Capitalism and the Remaking of New Orleans. He is also a representative for UIC United Faculty Local 6456, “An Open Letter to Ta-Nehisi Coates and the Liberals Who Love Him,” Jacobin Magazine, February 3, 2016, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/ta-nehisi-coates-case-for-reparations-bernie-sanders-racism/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=facebook&utm_source=socialnetwork>)

Ultimately, the historical narrative that underpins the reparations claim, a view of history that **emphasizes racial conflict as primary, white supremacy as hegemonic and immutable**, and black politics as insular and unitary, can only leave us with a **fatalistic view of political possibilities** that neglects the **rich, diverse history of interracial left political struggle**. Contrary to the arguments offered by Coates and others, interracial social movements, universal social policy, and an expanded public sector created the contemporary black middle class as we know it. Even as the slogan of white supremacy united various reactionary Southern elements and restored the power of the merchant-landlord class, interracial organizations fought to secure black freedom and create greater equality for black and white workers. The **Readjuster Party** in Virginia worked to unite workers against landed interests, and pressed for debt relief, lowered property taxes on farmers, chartered unions, established a black college, expanded public services, and removed the poll tax. Other organizations at the end of the nineteenth century posed a different interracial, left vision of American society — organizations like the Populist Party of the 1890s, the Knights of Labor, and the Citizens Committee of New Orleans. Throughout the twentieth century, struggles to expand labor rights, universal suffrage, and civil rights, and to abolish inequality, drew together diverse publics, creating concrete forms of social justice (albeit sometimes short-lived and imperfect). Whites who realized that their fates were intimately connected to those of southern blacks **supported struggles against racism**. Jim Crow segregation — the historical system of racial apartheid that was legitimated at the federal level by Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine in 1896, codified by the states, and strictly enforced through violence and intimidation — began a **long but certain death** after the Second World War. While contemporary forms of inequality in wealth, housing, schooling, and criminal justice may **bear a strong resemblance to Jim Crow**, these injustices are **classed** in ways that the ascriptive status of blacks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were not. Contemporary forms of oppression are not propelled by the need to subjugate black labor to the interests of Southern planters and industrialists, but as a means of managing a growing class of Americans who are not exclusively black but have been made obsolete by hyper-industrialization, the large-scale introduction of automation and cybernetic command, just-in-time production, and other strategies of flexible accumulation in US farms and factories. We continue to reach for **old modes of analysis** in the face of a **changed world**, one where **blackness is still derogated** but **anti-black racism is not the principal determinant of material conditions** and economic mobility for many African Americans. Social exclusion and labor exploitation are different problems, but they are never disconnected under capitalism. And both processes work to the advantage of capital. Segmented labor markets, ethnic rivalry, racism, sexism, xenophobia, and informalization all work against solidarity. Whether we are talking about antebellum slaves, immigrant strikebreakers, or undocumented migrant workers, it is clear that exclusion is often deployed to advance exploitation on terms that are most favorable to investor class interests. In other words, the most impoverished and dispossessed are hyper-exploited, placing downward pressure on wage floors, worsening conditions and undermining worker power in specific sectors and throughout society. Liberal antiracist discourse further isolates the conditions of the most excluded segments of workers, separating their experiences from those of other workers, and their labor from the broader processes at work, instead of emphasizing the empirical and potential political unity of the laboring classes. Respect for difference is valued in today’s multicultural milieu, but the **mobilization of different sub-strata of the working class against one another** has long been a cherished strategy of capital. In our own times, this has been a vaunted campaign strategy of the New Right since the presidential campaigns of Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, and Richard Nixon in the sixties. Throughout that decade and into the early seventies, each man contributed to an ever more expansive repertoire of anti–civil rights and anti–New Left rhetoric, tugging the exposed, fraying threads of the New Deal coalition. In his bid for the Republican presidential nomination, Donald **Trump has reached for the same playbook** the New Right has used for decades, speaking in vile tones about the alleged criminality of Latino immigrants, talking openly about building a fence along the Mexican border, and calling for a US travel ban on all Muslims. As it has in previous election cycles, such racist patter has resonated among some alienated white rural and suburban voters, and those in less populous states, who find it easier to bash minorities, the alleged liberal media, or left intellectuals than to contest the power that neoliberal politicians, multinational corporations, and the investor class wield over their lives. **Only** in those historical moments when working-class and popular movements organize against these differences and around common predicaments and interests has society lurched toward greater equality. Many **contemporary antiracist liberals have lost sight of this** historical truth. And **we will continue to lose if we follow their lead.** While the currency of the antiracist position offered by Coates stems in part from the post-racial debates of the Obama age, it is also rooted in the longer, established role of the black intellectual interpreter to white publics and the transformation of the public intellectual enterprise due to the advent of social media networks and consumer-communication niches. As much as I resisted the incessant comparisons between Coates and Baldwin at first, I am starting to think they may have some value. Baldwin rose to prominence as a commentator on the crest of the struggle to defeat Jim Crow segregation, and he was an eloquent spokesman, one who called out the racism and liberal hypocrisy of Cold War America. His words rattled the affluent society and awakened American publics to the poverty and segregation in their midst. Unfortunately, the arrival of the black intellectual as gadfly and conscience of the nation in the television era bore a new set of problems. Too many well-meaning whites mistook their guilt and pleasure of self-flagellation for genuine unity with blacks and authentic antiracist political commitment — in other words, solidarity. That problem of replacing politics with public **therapy** endures to this day, and it flourishes in a context where social media linkages surrogate other historical forms of social interchange and collective action. Antiracist liberalism thrives in a context where the **performance of** self-loathing, **outrage**, and concern are easily traded public currency, instead of the more socially costly politics of public sacrifice and the **redistribution** of societal resources. Like Baldwin, I think Coates fulfills a similar historical role in assuaging white guilt. What we need instead is solidarity. I do not have any illusions about what Sanders or any other presidential candidate can accomplish, especially given the Republican control of Congress. Popular struggles and mass pressure have been the most effective means for advancing the most progressive changes in American society. But I’m also not so young and naïve to think that elections do not matter. We cannot expect to achieve greater equality through an election cycle, but elections can shape the political arena in meaningful ways and **create openings** for progressive social movements. **Having a pragmatic, mainstream left candidate who is gaining traction by making the case for social-democratic reform is historic and consequential.** Like the formation of the Labor Party in 1996, the anti-globalization movement of the late Clinton years, the mass protests against the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, the Wisconsin protests against Governor Scott Walker’s budget cuts, the 2012 Chicago Teachers Union strike, anti–police brutality struggles, the Fight for 15 campaign, and so forth, the Sanders campaign is part of a gathering tide of social struggles over the past two decades that have fought against neoliberal austerity, and circulated popular criticisms of the market forces and reactionary political choices that have created more material hardship, social angst, and debt for millions of Americans. Public-sector employment has played a powerful role in building the black middle class. Perhaps **the best case against Coates’s criticisms of universal, social-democratic public policy is the progressive history of black workers** and the United States Postal Service. Beginning with the Great Migration, which saw thousands of blacks leave the South for northern cities, the post office has long been a major employer of blacks — including Clyde Ross, the chief protagonist of Coates’s study of housing discrimination and the Contract Buyers Club in North Lawndale. The progressive, integrative role of the postal service and the public sector would only expand in the latter half of the twentieth century with shifting urban demography and the **organized power of blacks** in society writ large. The neoliberal project has decimated the public sector and **harmed black workers**, rolling up what had been a means of stable, unionized, livable wage employment. Moreover, the US Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision on “**right to work**” will likely weaken the organizing capacity of public unions by removing payment requirements for union dues. This is but the **latest campaign** in a broader class war, **one where black workers stand to lose like all others**. More than any other contest in recent memory, the 2016 Democratic presidential primary has provided us with a clear set of alternatives, a choice between the failed New Democratic policies of neoliberalism and social-democratic policies that might **revitalize the public sector** like guaranteed housing; free, quality education; and health care to all regardless of their ability to pay — all issues that have value among black constituencies. If we can’t take advantage of this opportunity and win a majority behind this kind of politics, anything more radical beyond it will remain just **a fantasy.**

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**[B]---Saying that an actor should do something doesn’t endorse nor legitimize it**

Saul **Newman**, PhD, Professor of Political Theory, Goldsmith University, London, **’11**

(*The Politics of Postanarchism*, pg. 114)

Despite the obvious pitfalls of the Leninist vanguard strategy, we should nevertheless take Zizek's challenge to Critchley seriously: that, in other words, the problem with the strategy of working outside the state is that it **may essentially leave the state intact**, and entail an irresponsible and even self-indulgent politics of demand that hides a secret reliance on the state to take care of the everyday running of society. Is there some truth to this claim? There are two aspects that I would like to address here. First, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state - say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war or an **end to draconian policing** - is one of the **basic strategies** of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands **does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy.** On the **contrary**, demands are made from a position **outside the established political order,** and they often **exceed the question of the implementation** of this or that specific measure. They implicitly **call into question the legitimacy** and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order that guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices that in reality violate and deny them. Jacques Ranciere gives a succinct example of this when he discusses Olympe de Gouges, who, at the time of the French Revolution, demanded that women be given the right to go to the Assembly. In doing so, she demonstrated the inconsistency between the promise of equality - invoked in a general sense and yet denied in the particular by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen - and the political order which was formally based on this: Women could make a twofold demonstration. They could demonstrate that they were deprived of the rights that they had, thanks to the Declaration of Rights. And they could demonstrate, through their public action, that they had the rights that the constitution denied to them, that they could enact those rights. So they could act as subjects of the Rights of Man in the precise sense that 1 have mentioned. They acted as subjects that did not have the rights that they had and had the rights that they had not.21

**If they win that these forms of action are good, we access them better---green**

**1AC Springer 16** [Simon, Professor of Human Geography at The University of Newcastle and Director of the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies at the UON, “Returning To Geography’s Radical Roots”, *The Anarchist Roots of Geography: Toward Spatial Emancipation,* p.72-73 SJ]

We must radically flip our mind-sets, as anarchist organization does not replace top-down state mechanisms in the sense of standing in for them. They abolish them by people instead building what they need for themselves, free from coercion or imposed authority. Throughout human history, people have organized themselves collectively to satisfy their own needs. Organization under anarchism is no different in this regard. As Colin Ward ([1973] 2001, 28) contends, “given a common need, a collection of people will, by trial and error, by improvisation and experiment, evolve order out of the situation—this order being more durable and more closely related to their needs than any kind of order external authority could provide.” This insight is derived from Kropotkin’s ([1902] 2008) observations of the history of human society, where he documented the centrality of cooperation linked to everyday life and described it as **mutual aid**. Although differentiated across space and time, mutual aid was and still is continuously present in human societies, even if its development is not uniform and the forms it takes are contextually specific. At certain times, in particular places, mutual aid has been central to social life, while at other times, the geographies of mutual aid have been all but hidden beneath domination, violence, and competition. Yet irrespective of adversarial conditions, mutual aid is always present, and “the moment we stop insisting on viewing all forms of action only by their function in reproducing larger, total, forms of inequality of power, we will also be able to see that anarchist social relations and non-alienated forms of action are all around us”(Graeber 2004, 76). The provision of social welfare did not originate with the state; it “evolved from the vast network of friendly societies and mutual aid organizations that had sprung up through working-class self-help in the 19th century” (Ward 1994, 27). Thus mutual aid is not a hypothetical model for how society might be shaped; it is already happening, providing ongoing opportunities for togetherness and emancipation. Unlike Marxists, who view history in utilitarian terms, anarchists recognize that means and ends cannot be separated (Baldelli 1971).The anarchist project, then, is one that aligns with feminism insofar as it is an attempt to promote the feminization of society through extending cooperation, equality, compassion, and sharing, which constitute mutual aid relations and contrast with the aggression, racism, exploitation, misogyny, homophobia, classism, and rivalry of our male-dominated, modern society 8 to a strategy of breaking the bonds of coercion and the chains of exploitation by encompassing an infinite number of everyday acts of resistance and cooperation .Childcare co-ops, street parties, gardening clinics, **learning networks**, flash mobs, community kitchens, unschooling groups, independent media collectives, rooftop occupations, freecycling activities, direct action organizations, radical samba, **peer-to-peer file sharing**, sewing workshops, tree sitting, monkey wrenching, spontaneous disaster relief, culture jamming, book fairs, microradio, building coalitions, collective hacking, dumpster diving, wildcat strikes, neighborhood tool sharing, tenants’ associations, workplace organizing, and squatting are all anarchism in action, each with decidedly spatial implications, and this is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. So what forms of action does anarchism take? “All forms,” Kropotkin ([1880] 2005,39) answered, indeed, the most varied forms, dictated by circumstances, temperament, and the means at disposal. Sometimes tragic, sometimes humorous, but always daring; sometimes collective, sometimes purely individual, this policy of action will neglect none of the means at hand, no event of public life, in order to keep the spirit alive, to propagate and **find expression for dissatisfaction**, to excite hatred against exploiters, to ridicule the government and expose its weakness, and above all and always, by actual example, to awaken courage and fan the spirit of revolt. It should be clear, then, that the practice of mutual aid, which rests at the very core of anarchism, is as much a critique of capitalism, imperialism, and patriarchy as it is of the authority claimed by the state. The problematic alignment of anarchism to nothing more than antistate modes of thought and practice serves to marginalize this particular trajectory of socialist thought, making it seem less viable or desirable among those who might otherwise be sympathetic to anarchist leanings.

## Case

#### The narrative of the aff has been peddled by Heritage hacks for decades – Left wingers and conservatives may approach mutual aid with different endpoints but both use the strategy as a means to trade off with state reform

Wuest 20 – Joanna Wuest holds the Fund for Reunion–Cotsen Postdoctoral Fellowship in LGBT Studies and is a lecturer at Princeton University. She studies and writes on the politics of identity and inequality.

Joanna Wuest, December 16 2020, “Mutual Aid Can’t Do It Alone,” The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/society/mutual-aid-pandemic-covid/

But members of our crowd aren’t the only ones extolling the virtues of mutual aid. For decades now—and especially since the pandemic started—libertarians and conservatives from organizations like the [Heritage Foundation](https://www.heritage.org/civil-society/commentary/time-rekindle-the-tradition-mutual-support) and writers for [National Review](https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/09/case-for-private-education-co-operatives/) have commended care provided by those other than the state. Like their counterparts on the left, these groups have advanced an understanding of mutual aid not as a tactic alone but as a vision for remaking society.

Though ideologically distinct, many on the left and the right now share a hope that mutual aid can overcome poverty and rigid class divisions through spontaneous, organic relationships rather than beginning from plans for serious structural reform. For instance, Brooklyn-based efforts have been [lauded](https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/07/26/895115149/love-and-solidarity-amid-coronavirus-mutual-aid-groups-resurge-in-new-york-city) for the cross-class mingling among people like tech workers and out-of-work restaurant workers that has come to define care networks in gentrified neighborhoods. And while the characterization of mutual aid as solidarity, not charity, stands in stark contrast with the conservative faith in tax havens that masquerade as philanthropy, the two converge on critiques of the government’s capacity to provide for the many.

It may sound churlish to be skeptical about this rekindled spirit of social generosity. But its anti-statist outlook ought to make mutual aid’s progressive advocates wary. After all, most on the left likely do not want to replace what remains of our welfare state with a gift economy, despite the romanticism attached to that more primitive condition of collaboration. Before we get too attached to mutual aid’s promise, it is worth looking back to the origins of its prominence in the United States, a time before voluntary associations were replaced by the care of the state.

# 1NR

**K**

**Turns case – foregrounding engagement key – their focus on waywardness creates a political vacuum that makes it easier to sustain ideological domination**

**Schwartz**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University, **‘15**

(Joseph, “Being Postmodern While Late Modernity Burned: On the Apolitical Nature of Contemporary Self-Defined “Radical” Political Theory,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, ed. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker and Michael J. Thompson, Chapter 7)

In 1995, political theorist Jeffrey Isaac, in an article entitled “The Strange Silence of Political Theory,” posed the following question: “given the historical, political, and seemingly theoretical significance of the Eastern European revolution against Soviet communism, why have American political theorists failed to hardly address the topic?”1 In 2015, one might pose a similar question: given the historical, political, and seemingly theoretical significance of the radical **increase in inequality** over the past 30 years in the United States, **why have American political theorists failed to hardly address the topic?** This essay explores how and why mainstream political theory has largely failed to conceive of the rise of neoliberal capitalism as a major threat to democracy in the United States and the world. Over the past 30 years, the predominant form of work in self-identified “radical” political theory has focused on the ontological and epistemological **issues of “difference**” and “the fiction of the **coherent self**.”2 Political theory, however, has devoted very little attention to how the right went about constructing a **new dominant ideology** during this same period. For the past 30 years, post-structuralist and difference theorists have attacked the rational chooser of Rawlsian liberalism **as a “falsely universal” subject**; meanwhile, the center-right consensus in favor of neoliberal capitalism has **succeeded in creating a new hegemonic universal subject**—the entrepreneurial, self-sufficient, **competitive individual**. A simple gleaning of the titles of the three hundred or so articles published between 1990 and the present in Political Theory, the “cutting-edge” journal of the subdiscipline, reveals less than ten articles that explicitly study the relationship between **inequality and democracy**.3 By a factor of 30-fold or more the casual observer would find articles on “identity,” “difference,” and “deconstruction.” This is not to deny the importance that “difference” plays within a democratic pluralist society, or the intellectual validity of interrogating how dominant institutional “norms” can constrict identity and choice. But the problem that vexed Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and Marx remains **more relevant than ever**: How do inequalities in wealth, income, power, and life-opportunity **contradict the formal commitment of liberal democracy** to the equal moral worth of persons? Theorists of “difference” contend that the differential needs of members of particular groups means that one-size-fits-all social policies cannot achieve true equality of life chances for each citizen. But what most theorists of difference have **neglected to note** **is that a political majority no longer exists in favor of social equality**, whether a pluralist conception of equality or not. While worrying about the “**homogenizing**” nature of social welfare liberalism, **radical political theory failed to notice that a new “universal” had triumphed** within the popular imaginary: the fair treatment of each and all through competition in the unregulated market. The post-structuralist turn in political theory in part arose as a reaction to fears that “difference politics” “essentialized” and homogenized the status of the self within groups. Post-structuralism rejected not only Rawlsian liberalism’s belief in a coherent, rational chooser, but also the granting of primacy by “identity politics” to the group as the shaper of individual identity. Instead, post-structuralist analysis emphasized the labile, incoherent, shifting nature of a “self ” constituted by “performative discursive iteration” of social norms. Post-structuralist theorists emphasized the agonal nature of politics and the ever-present possibilities that the “discursive self ” could “performatively resist” hegemonic norms.4 Ironically, just as allegedly radical theorists discerned the “radical Nietzschean” possibilities of individual “resistance,” the social and political options of working class and people of color in the United States were being severely constrained by rapidly growing social, economic, and political inequality.5

This essay analyzes how contemporary political philosophy’s primary focus upon epistemological and ontological questions has **hindered the field’s ability to speak forthrightly in favor of social solidarity** and democratic equality. **But this is not an exercise in political nostalgia**. There will be no romantic longing here **for a solidaristic, working class–based “left”** that unequivocally embraced a “universal” politics of social justice. We have had plenty of these rather unsophisticated paeans to the “old” majoritarian left.6 Unlike some who write in that vein, **I am well aware that forms of racial, national, and gender exclusion helped construct past forms of working-class solidarity**. Moreover, the “working class” has never been a truly homogenous and “universal class”; its identity and consciousness is constructed and contested in complex ways that reflect the intersectionality of not only race, class, gender, and sexuality, but also of ideology and culture.

Yet, absent a revival of a pluralist, majoritarian **left it is hard to imagine how “difference”** (or in old school terms, “pluralism”) **can be institutionalized in an egalitarian manner.** In some ways, the blindness of some theorists of “difference” to the reality that “difference” (or “diversity”) can (and is) being institutionalized on a radically inegalitarian social terrain (in which some “different” groups have much more power and opportunity than others) mimics the intellectual blindspot of the liberal pluralist theorist that dominated political theory in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, radical theorists pointed out that liberal pluralist society failed to be fully democratic because some groups had inordinate economic and political power as compared to their small numbers.7 Today, the same critique of “difference” can be made. “Different” groups certainly do not have power proportionate to their democratic numbers. And the “performative” options of working-class individuals, persons of color, women, and LGBTQ individuals are constrained by the structural distribution of racial, economic, and gendered forms of power.

1. **State engagement key – they say, “everything fucked so we should give up,” we say “everything fucked so we should radically restructure institutions.” Key to address inequality.**

**Thompson**, Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, **‘15**

(Michael J., “Inventing the “Political”: Arendt, Antipolitics, and the Deliberative Turn in Contemporary Political Theory,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, ed. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker and Michael J. Thompson, Chapter 3)

The twin pillars of her political theory—the reconstructed polis-ideal and an existentialist phenomenology of consciousness—**disable her from dealing with these problems.** The Greeks did not deal with this problem explicitly or in any satisfactory sense, their reliance on the institution of slavery dulling their conception of domination; and the influence of Jaspers and Heidegger shape a concept of freedom that is overly philosophical and nonrealist. Rights, law, justice—none of these concepts achieve any concrete meaning outside of the power of the state to institute them. **Without question**, the **anarchic** and **communitarian** implications of her thought need to be challenged and we must accept that the post-Hobbesian concept of the state **still possesses real validity**. The need to **rejuvenate politics** through more citizen participation is indeed an important goal; but the **structural form** it takes also needs to be kept in view. Arendt’s **dismissal of the modern state** **places her ideas in an even more precarious relation to the needs of real politics**. She views the state as one of modernity’s assaults on the “political.” The state mitigates against the kind of freedom that she sees as essential to the public, agora-like spaces of the polis. **It is within those spaces that power is created**, solidarity formed, and true equality and freedom are able to have sway. But any realist theory of politics will lead us to the conclusion that democracy requires the state.32 It requires the state because it is the **only** institution that can be used to **counterbalance** the kinds of **inequalities** and **injustice** that **inevitably spring up** in societies that have even the slightest degree of inequality in social power, whether based on property, privilege, capital, tradition, or whatever. The aim of radical politics must therefore **be to democratize the state and to democratize state power,** i.e., to orient it toward common, public ends. To be sure, justice cannot be fostered by friendship alone; and it is doubtful that the kind of friendship that Arendt sees at the core of her conception of the “political” has any real basis historically or sociologically. This does not, of course, minimize the view that social movements are a crucial vehicle for social change, but it does categorically invalidate the view that councils and wards are the proper institutional ends of any kind of modern politics.

**2. Waywardness is an useless organizational strategy –dissipates necessary momentum for real changes by strengthening the right .**

**Berman 15** – political science professor @ Barnard College

Sheri, “No Cheers For Anarchism” *Dissent* Volume 62, Number 4, Fall 2015 //

What are the uses of anarchism? The short answer is “not many.” Although anarchists have often been motivated by worthy aspirations and occasionally raised awareness of crucial issues, in general, anarchism is an ineffective way of improving the world. **Anarchists are better dreamers than doers**, and politics is the art of the possible. Although it may disappoint many on the left, a successful movement requires compromise, organization, and yes, even leadership, to actually get things done.¶ There are many variants and historical manifestations of anarchism, but characterizing all is a rejection of authority and hierarchy. Anarchists dream of a world without states, traditional political organizations, or any other structures that restrict individual freedom. Because they share such beliefs and goals with libertarians, anarchists are easily confused with them. In the American context, at least, the main distinction between the two concerns capitalism: anarchists view it as inherently coercive, while libertarians venerate it as the embodiment and guardian of individual rights. This has led the former to be viewed as left wing and the latter as right wing, but in reality, anarchists differ dramatically from other sectors of the modern left (just as libertarians differ dramatically from traditional conservatives and other factions of the modern right).¶ During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century anarchism’s rejection of traditional political organizations and activity led to its involvement in various uprisings and rebellions, the most important of which was the Paris Commune. Anarchists also became associated with “propaganda of the deed”—“spontaneous” and “voluntary” actions that reflected the power of the individual and were designed to inspire others. Although these actions need not necessarily be violent, they often were: during this period anarchists were responsible for a series of spectacular assassinations and bombings. A czar of Russia, presidents of Italy and France, kings of Portugal and Greece, and a president of the United States all met their ends at the hands of anarchists. Despite their often spectacular nature, anarchist activities were almost **uniformly unsuccessful**. For example, the Paris Commune’s [End Page 87] lack of internal organization, leadership, or agreed-upon goals left it prone to infighting and vulnerable to counter-attack; it was brutally crushed by the forces of counter-revolution. The most direct effect of assassinations and bombings, meanwhile, was to provide conservatives with a rationale for putting in place repressive measures against the entire left.¶ The ineffective nature of anarchism (including the violence it often entailed) and other Utopian movements led most on the left to turn away from them by the late nineteenth century and instead focus their energies on the creation of organized and disciplined parties and trade unions. Lenin famously excoriated anarchists and other “left-wing communists” as victims of an “infantile disorder, incapable of perseverance, organization, discipline and steadfastness.” Their efforts, he said, were premature and counterproductive: “Anarchism was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist sins of the working-class movement.” In Europe, persistent and effective political organizing enabled non-anarchist left-wing movements to transform the working class into a potent political force that was eventually able to force ancien régimes to accept democratization and at least some public social provision. And in Russia, of course, organization and discipline enabled Lenin and his band of communists to seize power directly during a crisis.¶ During the interwar period socialist parties became the bulwarks of democracy in many parts of Europe. Defending democracy meant that socialists needed to win elections and attract the support of the majority, which would in turn require compromises, trade-offs and patience—none of which appealed to anarchists. And so during the interwar period, anarchists returned to attacking the reigning order, even though it was now a democratic one in which socialists played a significant role. Indeed, during this period anarchists not only engaged in uprisings, rebellions, and other violent activities, they also attacked the “timidity” and “moderation” of those on the left who defended democracy. While it is certainly true that interwar democracy faced more powerful foes on the right than on the left during those years, anarchists significantly weakened democracy in manyplaces**,** most notably in Spain, where anarchist activity damaged and divided the left, provided fodder to the anti-democratic right, and helped pave the way for the civil war.¶ After 1945 the traditional, particularly social democratic, left helped put in place a postwar order that undergirded an unprecedented period of consolidated democracy, economic growth, and social stability in Europe and the West. Nonetheless by the 1960s many anarchist-influenced “New Left” and counter-culture movements (including punk and the Yippies in the United States, and squatters movements in many European cities) attacking the reigning “bourgeois, capitalist” order exploded onto the scene. While these movements did raise important issues—most notably the need to go beyond the political and economic achievements of the postwar order to [End Page 89] consider social problems and injustices as well—they also exhibited some notable pathologies. Some praised the likes of Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, and Fidel Castro—hardly icons of freedom—and showed scorn for public opinion and for the “masses” who didn’t share their vision of the world. In addition, although vehement in their rejection of the contemporary order, these movements had no realistic plan for changing it and only vague and often apolitical alternatives to offer. As François Mitterrand once said of the leaders of the May 1968 student movement, when they “wanted to explain the motivations behind their demonstrations . . . what a mish-mash of quasi-Marxism, what hotch-potch, what confusion.”¶ At the end of the twentieth century, anarchist-influenced movements re-emerged on the left, most often under the banner of anti-globalization. Once again, these movements highlighted some critical issues, most notably growing inequality and environmental degradation, but had little to offer beyond that. Many critics, for example, have drawn parallels between the substantial influence enjoyed by a variety of right-wing groups in America and the theatrics and ephemeral impact of the Occupy movement. In his recent book, Barney Frank, for example, contrasted the National Rifle Association’s persistent grassroots organizing and resultant ability to mobilize supporters to flood lawmakers’ offices with letters and calls and to vote as a bloc, with the inclination of many on the left to “hold public demonstrations, in which like-minded people gather to reassure each other of their beliefs.” Frank goes on to argue that “if you care deeply about an issue and are engaged in group activity on its behalf that is fun and inspiring and heightens your sense of solidarity with others . . . you are most certainly not doing your cause any good.”¶ Although snarky, Frank is fundamentally correct. Although anarchism’s skepticism of authority and hierarchy and its desire to create a better world are admirable, its state-less, apolitical vision of that world is dangerous, and its tactics, ineffective**.** Moreover, too often this vision has led anarchists to reject democracy, since the majority of citizens have proven consistently unsympathetic to it. And too often anarchism’s tactics have served primarily to dissipate the left’s energies and leave it vulnerable to attack by its better organized counterparts on the right.¶ While anarchists are correct to remind us that the left must dream, we must always remember that it must also do. **A left that criticizes the existing order without offering realistic plans for changing it** or broadly attractive alternatives to it **is always going to be defeated by its opponents**. [End Page 90]

1. **Narrative resistance – focusing politics on personal narratives like the one in the 1AC divests us of the ability to contest power imbalances.**

**Thompson**, Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, **‘15**

(Michael J., “Inventing the “Political”: Arendt, Antipolitics, and the Deliberative Turn in Contemporary Political Theory,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, ed. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker and Michael J. Thompson, Chapter 3)

The problem here is that she perceives “opinions” as **originating in some existentially distinctive self** rather than from social relations and the ways that ideas and opinions that people come to accept are generally **embedded** in the **institutional functions** of the world they inhabit. This is no place for a phenomenological “lifeworld”; the problem is cognitive: The concepts, opinions, and ideas of people **are shaped by the social relations within which they are situated**, **rather than springing from some existential “beginning**.” The importance of the ’αρχη´ in this sense—as rule and as origin or beginning—**is that it denotes a self that is somehow presocial** and existentially prior to any form of socialization. We are asked to believe that each person does in fact initiate an ’ αρχη´, that each individual is somehow unique and that this constitutes a valid basis for forming political knowledge about the world. In contrast to this, the problem of social power must be conceived as a problem of domination. Domination is not simply a process whereby one has legal or some other form of authority over an other; **it is a situation where social relations are constructed** **in order to extract benefit from others**, control and subordinate them for some self-interested purpose, as well as order the field of ideas and opinions to legitimate those structures of extractive power. Opinion thereby becomes victimized by a sensus communis **colonized by norms** **and values rooted in the prevailing forms of legitimacy. Opinion effectively expresses reified thought**. Without truth, each opinion must be taken and accepted on its face; each is “isonomic” in the political realm, as are their opinions.17 But if we were to accept this thesis, so crucial for Arendt’s thought, we **would find ourselves in a condition where ideological consciousness is free to reign**, where opinion about things and the world has **no objective metric** for us to be able to gauge its relevance. We would find ourselves **adrift**, **with no way to shatter the reified structures of consciousness** **that allow real political and social power to hold sway**. In the modern age, we cannot separate the dimension of surplus extraction from that of the constitution of values, norms, and commonly accepted opinions since they work in tandem to **form the social order itself.**

This is one reason **why any valid conception of politics cannot**, however, **remain within the confines of opinion**. It is not the case that all knowledge, **all search for rational truths are limited to surface phenomena**. The reality is that **truth-claims constitute the very substance of political power and authority itsel**f. Indeed, as Rousseau and Weber knew all too well, the basic problem of political power in the modern world is the way it is **made legitimate** in the minds of its members.18 **Violence and coercion**, in contrast to Arendt’s thinking, **are not the main tools of those who seek domination**—rather, **it is legitimacy**. And this legitimacy is constructed by **cultivating opinion**, by weaving the cognitive and valueorientational prerequisites that in turn legitimate the concrete forms of power that pervade the social world. Domination, the real concern of politics, is therefore **functional in nature**: **Institutional power is built from the minds of its participants**, not from fiat. Truth is therefore a means by which we **shed the ideological valences** of thought that are shaped by socialization. **It colonizes precisely those capacities and forms of “thinking”** that Arendt sees as constituting freedom and “action.” Indeed, since Arendt’s project is to carve out and define a distinctive sphere of thinking and acting that is nonscientific, she is forced to rely on the phenomenological tools she has ready-at-hand. **The denigration of truth-claims is a major weakness in her approach**, **and it has encouraged many other subsequent theorists to dispense with the importance of truth-claims and their political import for politics**.

**Starting at the community level can’t solve—they are predetermined by capitalism—only engaging the state solves.**

**Robinson 14**—Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate — often forcibly — and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism — to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because **such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism,** and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

1. **It fails – organization and sequencing are impossible without our framing**

**Smulewicz-Zucker**, Editor of Logos and adjunct professor of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY, **and Thompson**, Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, **‘15**

(Gregory and Michael J., “Introduction,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, pg. 1-32)

These four elements of the new radical intellectuals and the movements they have influenced are in **direct contradiction** to the rational radicalism that we implicitly espouse here. On our reading, there is not only a **theoretical** but also a **deeply political** difference between what these theorists search for and the Enlightenment-inspired radical view **of a social order marked by solidarity** around common goods, civic virtue oriented toward the defense of the public welfare, well-ordered political institutions with public purpose as their aim, constitutionalism that secures individual rights, and the democratization of economic life as the criterion of social justice. The alternative move, marked by claims that have given shape to radical and critical thought since the Enlightenment, not to mention the **common sense** that the thinkers we address have sought to evade. We believe that the success of these thinkers and ideas marks a real and **disturbing departure** from the more rationalist, more realist **understanding of progressive and radical politics** that marked the more **successful movements** of the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century.

The basic thesis that organizes the essays that follow is that these thinkers and their ideas have had a disintegrating effect on the nature of progressive politics, and each chapter in this book shows how this has taken place and, of equal importance, contrasts this with a more lucid, more compelling account of what progressive political and social criticism ought to be able to achieve. **Our purpose is to indict a style of theory** and thinking that has become so **esoteric** and **self-referential** that it has divorced itself from the **historic concerns** of progressive politics: from **remedying inequality**, confronting forces eroding our public goods, **or challenging the entrenched power** of political and economic elites. Whether it is a rampant **irrationalism**, a **rejection of any sense of realism** in politics, **naive antistatism**, theories of power and oppression that have **no empirical basis**, or simply an **incoherent**, confused set of texts upon which one can **project** and read **whatever one wants**, these thinkers have been able to **seduce** a generation **into an understanding of politics that privileges an abstract**, self-regarding “politics” **over the concrete analysis of power and a politics based on the public good.**

**No push-out DA.**

**Smith 6**

[Sharon Smith is also the author of Women and Socialism: Essays on Women’s Liberation (Haymarket Books, 2005). Her writings appear regularly in Socialist Worker newspaper and the ISR. Race, class, and "whiteness theory" ISR Issue 46, March–April 2006 http://isreview.org/issues/46/whiteness.shtml]

Meyerson counters this set of assumptions, proposing that Marx’s emphasis on the centrality of class relations brings oppression to the forefront, as a precondition for working-class unity: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One, of course, is **the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent**—a primacy which **does not**, as often thought, **render women and people of color “secondary**.” Such an equation of white male and working class, as well as a corresponding division between a “white” male working class identity and all the others, whose identity is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid, is a view this essay contests all along the way. The primacy of class means that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement: the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender and class oppression. **Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not.**18 **Designating class as the primary antagonism** in capitalist society **bears no inference on the “importance” of racism**, as Roediger claims. Marxism merely assumes a causal relationship—that white supremacy as a system was instituted by capital, to the detriment of labor as a whole. Marxist theory rests on the assumption that white workers do not benefit from a system of white supremacy. Indeed, Marx argued of slavery, the most oppressive of all systems of exploitation, “In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured part of the republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.”19 Marx was not alone in assuming that racism, by dividing the working class along ideological lines, harmed the class interests of both white and Black workers. Abolitionist Frederick Douglass stated unambiguously of slaveholders, “They divided both to conquer each.”20 Douglass elaborated, “Both are plundered and by the same plunderers. The slave is robbed by his master, of all his earnings above what is required for his physical necessities; and the white man is robbed by the slave system, because he is flung into competition with a class of laborers who work without wages.”21 Capitalism forces workers to compete with each other. The unremitting pressure from a layer of workers—be they low-wage or unemployed—is a constant reminder that workers compete for limited jobs that afford a decent standard of living. The working class has no interest in maintaining a system that thrives upon inequality and oppression. Indeed, all empirical evidence shows quite the opposite. When the racist poll tax was passed in the South, imposing property and other requirements designed to shut out Black voters, many poor whites also lost the right to vote. After Mississippi passed its poll tax law, the number of qualified white voters fell from 130,000 to 68,000.22 The effects of segregation extended well beyond the electoral arena. Jim Crow segregation empowered only the rule of capital. Whenever employers have been able to use racism to divide Black from white workers, preventing unionization, **both Black and white workers earn lower wages**. This is just as true in recent decades as it was 100 years ago. Indeed, as Shawki points out of the 1970s, “In a study of major metropolitan areas Michael Reich found a correlation between the degree of income inequality between whites and Blacks and the degree of income inequality between whites.”23 The study concluded: But what is most dramatic—in each of these blue-collar groups, the Southern white workers earned less than Northern Black workers. Despite the continued gross discrimination against Black skilled craftsmen in the North, the “privileged” Southern whites earned 4 percent less than they did. Southern male white operatives averaged…18 percent less than Northern Black male operatives. And Southern white service workers earned…14 percent less than Northern Black male service workers.”24 Racism against Blacks and other racially oppressed groups serves both to lower the living standards of the entire working class and to weaken workers’ ability to fight back. **Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another**—poorly paid—**group** of workers, **neither group benefits**. Thus, the historically nonunion South has not only depressed the wages of Black workers, but also lowered the wages of Southern white workers overall—and prevented the labor movement from achieving victory at important junctures. So even in the short term **the working class** as a whole **has nothing to gain from oppression.**